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Abstract
Political scientists’ failure to pay careful attention to the content (as opposed to
the operationalization) of their chosen definition of ‘democracy’ can make them
liable to draw invalid inferences from their empirical research. With this problem
in mind, we argue for the following proposition: if one wishes to conduct empiri-
cal research that contributes to an existing conversation about democracy, then one
must choose a definition of ‘democracy’ that picks out the topic of that conversa-
tion as opposed to some other (perhaps nearby) topic of conversation. We show
that, as a practical matter, one of the most effective methods for preserving “topic
continuity” is to choose a definition of ‘democracy’ that concurs with prevailing
judgments about how to classify particular regimes, emphasizing the superiority
(in this regard) of judgments about stylized hypothetical scenarios as opposed to
judgments about the actual regimes we observe in our datasets.
Before we can study the causes and consequences of democracy, we must first choose
how to define and measure the concept of democracy.1 Political scientists recognize
this, of course, as attested by the large literature that addresses these and related topics
(among others, see Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010; Collier and Adcock, 1999;
Coppedge et al., 2016; Goertz, 2006; Munck, 2009; Paxton, 2000). Existing discus-
sions predominantly focus on measurement issues: whether to use a dichotomous or
many-valued measure; the choice of measurement scale (e.g., nominal, ordinal, or in-
terval); the choice of indicators to operationalize the underlying concept; the choice of
mathematical operations to aggregate indicator scores. Even those contributions that
discuss conceptual issues more directly tend to use measurement-related criteria to as-
sess choices about how to define ‘democracy’. For example, Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland (2010), echoing Przeworski et al. (2000), defend their minimalist definition
1Strictly speaking, concepts are not defined; instead, words are defined so as to refer to one concept rather
than another. So, instead of talking about “how to define and measure the concept of democracy”, it is more
accurate to say “how to define the word ‘democracy’ — that is, how to choose which concept ‘democracy’
should refer to — and measure the concept referred to by that word”. But this formulation is unacceptably
cumbersome. For the remainder of the paper, with some abuse of language, we use phrases like “define the
concept of democracy” and “define [the word] ‘democracy”’ interchangeably to mean “choose the concept
to which the word ‘democracy’ should refer”. We use ‘democracy’ (in single quotation marks) to mark the
word and, where appropriate, the concept picked out by the word.
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of democracy as competitive elections on the grounds that it can be operationalized
by “clear and stark” coding rules, which results in a measure that conveys “precise
information” about observations; additionally, these coding rules “involve[] no subjec-
tivity”, referring wholly to observable features of regimes, thus producing an “easily
reproducible” measure (2010, p. 71).
In this paper, we set aside measurement concerns to emphasize issues that arise
when we make choices about conceptual content. To motivate and focus our discus-
sion, we start by showing how political scientists’ failure to pay careful attention to
the content (as opposed to the operationalization) of their chosen definition of ‘democ-
racy’ can make them liable to draw invalid inferences from their empirical research.
These threats to valid inference raise important questions about how to assess candi-
date definitions of ‘democracy’ with regard to their conceptual content. We show that
attempts to answer these questions while retaining a heavy emphasis on measurement-
related issues are implausible. We then introduce the idea of topic continuity (Cappe-
len, 2018) and demonstrate its importance for choosing among alternative definitions
of ‘democracy’. The basic idea is that definitions of ‘democracy’ determine topics of
conversation; that is, how one understands the concept of democracy shapes what one
believes one is thinking/speaking/writing/inquiring about when using the term ‘democ-
racy’. With this in mind, we argue for the following proposition, roughly stated for
now: If one wishes to conduct empirical research that contributes to an existing con-
versation about democracy (scholarly or not), then one must choose a definition of
‘democracy’ that “picks out” the topic of that conversation as opposed to some other
(perhaps nearby) topic of conversation. We further show that, as a practical matter, one
of the most effective methods for preserving topic continuity is to choose a definition
of ‘democracy’ that concurs with prevailing judgments about how to classify particular
regimes.
This practical recommendation may raise a skeptical concern that anchoring choices
regarding conceptual content to “subjective” judgments about particular cases is anti-
scientific and arbitrary (cf. Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). We address these
concerns by showing that political scientists already implicitly (though unsystemati-
cally) appeal to judgments about particular cases as a way to craft a shared understand-
ing of the topic under discussion. One way to characterize our aim, then, is to make
explicit the criterion of topic continuity so that we can think systematically about its
relevance, as well as craft best practices for its application in choosing among candidate
definitions of ‘democracy’. With respect to best practices, we address lingering skep-
ticism by showing how the application of topic continuity to test and choose among
candidate definitions of ‘democracy’ can be improved and made scientifically credible
by appealing to judgments about stylized hypothetical scenarios as opposed to judg-
ments about the actual observations we record in our empirical datasets.
Although we confine our attention to adjudicating among competing definitions of
‘democracy’, this is just one example of a more general phenomenon in political sci-
ence. Other central concepts in the discipline — for example, the concepts of power,
accountability, political representation, rule of law, and so on — admit of multiple, con-
flicting interpretations. A scholar’s choice of definition can be consequential, affecting
the questions she poses, the hypotheses she entertains, and the framing of the research
findings. When we face such choices, a natural question is whether some definitions
2
are better than others, and by what criteria we might make such comparisons. Our
reflections in this paper generalize to this broader context: whatever the concept one
is using to articulate empirical hypotheses and explanatory theories, one must not only
pay careful attention to the operationalization of that concept, but must also ensure that
one’s choices with respect to conceptual content produce a definition that corresponds
to the topic of the conversation to which one wishes to contribute.
1 The consequences of neglecting conceptual content
Following Joseph Schumpeter’s (1942) minimalist view of democracy, political scien-
tists have largely converged on a procedural approach to defining ‘democracy’: democ-
racy is roughly defined as an institutional arrangement for selecting political leaders
through competitive elections. No doubt, there is dispute about which institutions and
procedures constitute a democracy. All definitions accept that competitive elections are
a necessary condition for democracy. Remaining disputes thus concern whether com-
petitive elections are sufficient for democracy and, if not, which features or attributes
must be added for a regime to count as democratic. Some argue that competitive elec-
tions are sufficient (Przeworski et al., 2000; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010).
Most, however, accept some sort of minimum suffrage or participation requirement
as necessary for democracy (e.g., Boix, Miller and Rosato, 2012; Dahl, 1971; Pax-
ton, 2000). Many also argue that effective guarantees for citizens’ civil and political
rights are a necessary condition (e.g., Collier and Levitsky, 1997; Dahl, 1971; Free-
dom House, 2020; Levitsky and Way, 2010), although it is not always clear whether
such guarantees are treated merely as a way to operationalize the idea of competitive
elections (because, e.g., civil rights guarantees tend to support genuinely competitive
elections; see Levitsky and Way 2010) or whether they are treated as a defining feature
of democracies and, thus, should be included in addition to the condition of competitive
elections. Beyond these, a range of further conditions are proposed as defining features
of democracy, for example: that elected governments must be able to rule effectively
and without interference from unelected agencies (Adcock and Collier, 2001), or that
the executive’s decision-making authority is constrained by other government or civil
society agencies (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2018).
Not every political scientist subscribes to the procedural view, to be sure; especially
in the literature on democratic representation, scholars frequently cite Dahl’s claim that
a “key characteristic of a democracy is continuing responsiveness of the government to
the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (1971, p. 1). Dahl’s claim
can be seen as one interpretation of the traditional idea, rooted in the original mean-
ing of the Greek demokratia, that democracy is a form of rule (kratos) by the people
(demos). Besides popular rule, one could think of various related concepts with which
‘democracy’ has historically been closely identified, such as popular control, popu-
lar sovereignty, popular government, collective self-government, and so on. Advocates
for the procedural view do not typically reject this traditional understanding of ‘democ-
racy’ but instead propose the procedural view as a definition for a technical concept,
one that “systematizes” (Adcock and Collier, 2001) the vague and intuitive connota-
tions of the traditional definition and, thus, renders the traditional definition amenable
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to operationalization in terms of observable features of regimes (e.g., Coppedge et al.,
2016; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Munck, 2009).2 But these differences are generally
considered relatively minor. We think it is more than fair to say that there is broad
agreement among political scientists that a procedural definition of ‘democracy’ is best
suited to the purposes of empirical political science.
One might be tempted to resist our claim of a broad agreement on a procedural
definition by highlighting the wide range of democracy measures on offer and the
relatively vigorous disputes about their respective merits as measurement instruments
(e.g., Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010; Collier and Adcock, 1999; Coppedge et al.,
2016; Elkins, 2000; Treier and Jackman, 2008). But disputes about conceptual content
are distinct from disputes about measurement validity insofar as the latter presuppose
agreement on conceptual content. Indeed, agreement on a procedural definition has
allowed scholars to acknowledge this distinction only to set aside conceptual issues
and focus instead on measurement validity (e.g., Adcock and Collier, 2001; Seawright
and Collier, 2012). Measurement validity is obviously an important issue, given the
problems that measurement error can pose for scientific inference about the causes and
consequences of democracy.3 However, this overwhelming focus on avoiding measure-
ment error has obscured the ways in which inferential validity can depend not only on
one’s choice of measure but also on one’s choice of conceptual content. Put differently,
due to their fixation on finding a valid measure of the concept of democracy, political
scientists have failed to see how choices related to conceptual content can threaten the
validity of certain inferences from empirical research even if that research uses a valid
measure of the chosen concept.
To get an intuition for how one’s choice of conceptual content can threaten infer-
ential validity, consider the following schematic scenario. Imagine a researcher wants
to study the effect of democracy on some outcome of interest, say, economic growth,
which is operationalized using a variable Y . Suppose the researcher adopts a procedural
definition of ‘democracy’ and operationalizes this concept using a variable C (“com-
petitive elections”), which we assume is a valid measure of the procedural definition.
Using a research design that is appropriate for causal identification, the researcher finds
that C has a substantial and significant positive effect on Y . In summarizing these find-
ings, the researcher writes: “Contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy increases
economic growth.” If the conventional wisdom that is allegedly overturned is articu-
lated using a procedural definition of ‘democracy’, then we can validly conclude that
the study’s findings challenge the conventional wisdom. Since this case is straightfor-
ward, we set it aside.
Things are less straightforward when the conventional wisdom presupposes a dif-
ferent definition of ‘democracy’ — for example, “rule by the people” or one of its
cognates. Can we validly infer that the empirical findings overturn the conventional
wisdom in this case? Our answer to this question will turn on our beliefs about the
true causal structure relating competitive elections, economic growth, and rule by the
2Schumpeter (1942); Przeworski et al. (2000); Riker (1982) are examples of scholars who present a min-
imal procedural definition as a replacement for the traditional definition of ‘democracy’, rejecting popular
rule and its cognates for one reason or another.
3For an example, see Paxton’s (2000) discussion of how measurement error arising from neglect for
women’s suffrage threatens inferences about democratic transitions.
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Figure 1: A regime’s status as a com-
petitive electoral regime (C) affects
whether it is a regime that provides cit-
izens with an adequate degree of con-
trol (P), which in turn affects economic
growth (Y). Competitive elections af-
fect growth only through their effects
on citizens’ degree of control. Ev-
idence that they affect the growth is
evidence that popular control affects
growth.
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C
Figure 2: A regime’s status as a com-
petitive electoral regime (C) affects
the extent to which citizens have con-
trol over political decisions (P), which
in turn affects economic growth (Y).
Competitive elections also directly af-
fect growth (Y). Evidence regarding
the effect of competitive elections on
growth is not evidence for the effect of
popular control on growth.
people (or whatever the definition presupposed by conventional wisdom picks out). To
illustrate this point, let P be a (perhaps unobservable) variable that indicates citizens’
degree of control over political outcomes (which corresponds to a popular control defi-
nition of ‘democracy’). Let’s stipulate that the “conventional wisdom” under investiga-
tion claims that increasing citizens’ control over political outcomes reduces economic
growth rates.
Suppose, to start, that the true causal relationships are as depicted in figure 1: hav-
ing competitive elections causally affects citizens’ control over political decisions and
influences economic growth, if at all, only via its effect on popular control. Given this
causal structure, if the empirical study shows that competitive elections cause an in-
crease in growth, then we can validly conclude that the study’s findings overturn the
conventional wisdom.
Now suppose, instead, that the true causal structure is given by figure 2: competi-
tive elections causally influence economic growth rates indirectly, via its effect on citi-
zens’ control, but also directly. Given this causal structure, the finding that competitive
elections increase growth presents no evidence against the conventional wisdom. In-
deed, the conventional wisdom could still be consistent with the hypothetical findings.
This would be so if increasing popular control reduces growth rates while competitive
elections increase growth.
Clearly, in this example, one cannot validly conclude that the empirical study over-
turns the conventional wisdom until one persuasively argues that the true causal struc-
ture is one way rather than another. Even if C is a valid measure of a procedural
definition of ‘democracy,’ and one’s research design ensures valid inferences about the
effects of C on Y , still one cannot draw conclusions about the effect of democracy as
the conventional wisdom conceptualizes it without first establishing the causal struc-
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ture relating the variables associated by the procedural and conventional definitions of
‘democracy’. Observe, too, that, absent assumptions about the true causal structure,
such conclusions would be invalid even if there is perfect correlation between C and
P, the two measures of democracy corresponding to the procedural and conventional
definitions of ‘democracy’, respectively. This points to a broader lesson: In contexts
where the term ‘democracy’ is used to refer to several distinct concepts, these concep-
tual differences pose threats to inferential validity that cannot be addressed by estab-
lishing that one is using a valid measure of one’s chosen definition of ‘democracy’ or
demonstrating or that one’s empirical research design ensures causal identification. Put
simply, drawing valid inferences from our empirical research requires us to pay careful
attention to conceptual content.4
This is not a merely hypothetical scenario. For a familiar example, Przeworski and
colleagues (2000) endorse a minimalist procedural definition of ‘democracy’: “‘democ-
racy,’ for us, is a regime in which those who govern are selected through contested
elections” (p. 15). This definition is operationalized using a dichotomous measure of
regime type, which is produced using four coding rules that focus on the presence or
absence of competitive elections within a regime (see pp. 18–29 for details). Using
this measure of contested elections, Przeworksi et al. subsequently study the empirical
relationship between democracy and economic investment. Responding to a literature
that “claim[s] that democracy undermines investment” and, in turn, economic growth,
Przeworski et al. argue that this claim “finds no support in the evidence” (p. 146).
On closer inspection, however, the existing literature they are addressing is not about
the economic effects of elections per se, but about the effect of increasing citizens’
influence over economic policy. Indeed, two of the articles they cite to motivate their
countervailing analysis do not even mention elections or voters but instead focus on the
investment effects of increasing workers’ policy influence via unions and labor parties
(see p. 142).5 Przeworski et al. thus find themselves in a situation where the literature
they address argues that increasing citizens’ policy influence deters investment, while
their empirical analysis shows that the presence or absence of competitive elections
makes no difference to rates of investment.
One might defend the relevance of their findings to the broader debate by arguing
that their measure of competitive elections is a valid instrument for popular influence,
as in Figure 1. Ironically, Przeworski et al. themselves express doubts about the link
between competitive elections and popular influence when they defend their choice of
a procedural definition of ‘democracy’ (p. 33), so they are not in a position to defend
4One might argue here that we can validly infer that the imagined empirical study overturns the conven-
tional wisdom if we show that C is a valid instrument for drawing inferences about the effect of popular
control on economic growth. We agree with this point, but it does nothing to blunt the force of the point we
are making here: that valid inference requires paying attention to conceptual content in addition to measure-
ment validity and empirical research design. To wit, to establish that C is a valid instrument, one must argue
for claims about the true causal structure, an argumentative burden that is revealed by attending to poten-
tial differences in conceptual content. And, further, arguing that C is a valid instrument for popular control
is only one approach to resolving these conceptual differences — one that leaves unresolved the questions
about how to define ‘democracy’ that we focus on here.
5E.g., they quote from the following passage in de Schweinitz (1959): “Trade unions and labor parties,
however, raise problems of a different order. If they are successful in securing a larger share of the national
income and in limiting the freedom of action of entrepreneurs, they may have the effect of restricting the
investment surplus so much that the rate of economic growth is inhibited” (p. 388).
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their research design in these terms. In any case, our claim is not that Przeworski et
al.’s conclusions vis-a`-vis the existing literature are in fact invalid. Our point is instead
that the validity of their inferences vis-a`-vis the existing literature depends on assump-
tions about the causal relationship between the variable associated with their concept
and the variable associated with their interlocutors’ distinct concept. Vindicating this
assumption is a burden they fail to acknowledge, much less address.
As a second example, Acemoglu et al. (2019) claim to show that democracy causes
economic growth. For their statistical analyses, they construct a novel dichotomous
measure of democracy from several extant indices: Freedom House, Polity IV, Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) (which updates Przeworski et al.’s [2000] measure), and
Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) (see pp. 53–4 and their online appendix for details).
This measure operationalizes a procedural definition of ‘democracy’: a democracy is
a regime in which political leaders are selected via competitive elections, there are in-
stitutional checks on executive authority, and citizens enjoy minimal civil and political
rights (appendix, p. A4). Using this measure, and a causal identification strategy whose
assumptions we can grant for the sake of argument, Acemoglu et al. infer that democ-
racy causes economic growth, and draw conclusions about a host of subsidiary results
pertaining to mechanisms: that democracy “increas[es] investment, encourag[es] eco-
nomic reforms, improv[es] the provision of schooling and health care, and reduc[es]
social unrest” (p. 51). These results are said to challenge widespread “[s]kepticism
about the [economic] performance of democracy,” skepticism that is said to go back to
Plato and Aristotle (p. 96). But if Plato and Aristotle are supposed to be representatives
of this skeptical view, then it cannot be a view about the economic consequences of se-
lecting leaders via competitive elections or of granting citizens minimal liberal rights—
contemporary democratic procedures and institutions had no place in classical political
theorists’ theoretical framework (cf. Ober, 2017). Consider the quotes Acemoglu et
al. include (p. 96): Plato’s concern is with a regime in which “idle spendthrifts” “are
almost the entire ruling power”, while Aristotle’s contention is that “it is not safe to
trust them [the bulk of the people] with the first offices of the state” (original interpo-
lation). More generally, classical skepticism about democracy up to the late eighteenth
century focused on the consequences of granting ordinary citizens significant political
power by allowing them to occupy political offices. We see, then, that Acemoglu et
al. use a measure of a procedural view of democracy to address a skeptical view that
defines ‘democracy’ in terms of more traditional notions such as popular rule or pop-
ular control. Thus, to validly infer that their empirical results challenge this skeptical
view, it is incumbent on them to defend assumptions about how the variable associated
with their concept of democracy relates to the distinct variable associated with their
interlocutors’ concept of democracy. Because they ignore questions about conceptual
content, Acemoglu et al. fail to acknowledge this burden.
These are not exotic examples drawn from the periphery of the discipline. These
are some of the most influential social scientists drawing the kinds of inferences that
are the bread-and-butter of empirical democracy research. Our point, to be clear, is
not that the inferences we’ve highlighted are in fact invalid. It is instead to point out
the ways in which failure to pay careful attention to the content of different definitions
of ‘democracy’ leaves the validity of these kinds of inferences in doubt and open to
challenges that few empirical social scientists appreciate.
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2 Choosing definitions of democracy
Our discussion in the previous section raises pressing questions about how to choose
among different definitions of ‘democracy’. How should we settle on a definition of
‘democracy’, given the myriad possibilities? More specifically, how (if at all) should
one’s choice of definition be constrained by others’ understanding of ‘democracy’? To
prepare the ground for a plausible answer to this question, let’s consider some proposals
that would prompt little to no change to the current measurement-focused practice.
Consider first the proposal that social scientists are free to stipulate just any defini-
tion of ‘democracy’. A moment’s reflection is enough to see that this view is far too
crude. A good definition has to be logically consistent and must be deemed better, all
else being equal, if its implications are clear and unambiguous. Moreover, if the goal
is a definition that is fruitful for empirical inquiry, it is better, all else being equal, if
it picks out a concept that can be measured, and so criteria for the choice of measures
(e.g., Adcock and Collier, 2001; Collier and Adcock, 1999; Coppedge, 2012, chap. 2;
Munck, 2009, chap. 2; Seawright and Collier, 2012) must indirectly constrain how one
stipulates a definition of ‘democracy’. Political scientists recognize this point; they
err, not in neglecting it, but in focusing almost exclusively on measurement-related
concerns when evaluating definitions.
Internal consistency and the requirements of good measurement cannot be the only
constraints on stipulated definitions of democracy. To see why, suppose (what is ab-
surd) that Przeworski et al. (2000) had stipulated that ‘democracy’ is to refer to political
regimes in which the chief executive’s astrological sign is Libra. This definition can
be readily operationalized so as to meet their technical criteria for a good measure; in
particular, it can be “formalize[d]. . . in terms of rules that can be decisively and reli-
ably applied to the observable aspects of national histories” (p. 13). Nonetheless, the
definition is absurd. One reason someone might give is that it violates a criterion that
is at least implicitly acknowledged by most political scientists:
Explanatory significance. All else being equal, a good measure (and, in turn, the
definition chosen to fit with the measure) picks out attributes (e.g., of regimes)
that figure in explanations of otherwise puzzling facts (cf. Przeworski et al., 2000,
p. 14; Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, pp. 72–3).
Note that this criterion imposes a content-related (as opposed to a measurement-related)
constraint on acceptable definitions of ‘democracy’. Insofar as one accepts this crite-
rion — and we cannot think of anyone who rejects it — one must reject the thought that
operationalization issues are all that matter when choosing a definition of ‘democracy’.
One might still persist with the thought that scholars are permitted to stipulate a
definition of democracy, although within the bounds set by the constraints noted thus
far. Even this more nuanced proposal runs into immediate problems. To illustrate,
suppose we agree that a procedural minimalist definition (e.g., that given by Przeworski
et al.) satisfies all relevant operationalization-related criteria as well as the criterion of
explanatory significance. Imagine now that a scholar stipulates the
Kindergartener’s definition: A regime is a democracy if (and only if) it is not a com-
petitive electoral regime.
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From the perspective of a procedural minimalist, one who stipulates the kindergartener’s
definition is like the child who decides to use words as if they meant the opposite of
what they actually mean. We expect that most scholars would reject the kindergartner’s
definition. Note, however, that it fares no worse than existing minimalist definitions
with respect to the criteria we’ve accepted thus far since it simply reverses the labels of
the classification scheme produced by existing minimalist measures.
One obvious reason to reject the kindergartner’s definition in favor of a procedu-
ral minimalist definition is that the former is liable to produce confusion whereas the
latter is not. This is on the right track, but it’s important to be clear about the kind of
confusion that would ensue from using the kindergartner’s definition. Notice, in par-
ticular, that whatever confusion it would create, it would do so despite satisfying the
criteria of explanatory significance and operationalizability. It can be operationalized
using the same rules for coding indicators and aggregating indicator scores as those
used by existing minimalist measures, and if whether a regime is a competitive elec-
toral regime has explanatory significance, then whether a regime is not a competitive
electoral regime must also have such significance.
If the kindergartner’s definition creates confusion, it is not because it fares poorly
by the criteria noted thus far, but because it deviates from the concept of democracy as
it is typically understood. This suggests that an acceptable definition of ‘democracy’
must be tethered to others’ understanding of the concept’s content. Exactly how is still
unclear, but we can put to rest the idea that purely stipulative definitions of ‘democ-
racy’, which ignore how one’s interlocutors understand the concept of democracy, are
acceptable.
How should existing understandings of the concept of democracy constrain one’s
definition? During its long history, people have apparently meant all kinds of things by
‘democracy’, often considered the paradigmatic example of an “essentially contested
concept” (Gallie, 1956; cf. Collier, Hidalgo and Maciuceanu, 2006). Scholars routinely
warn against the unproductive and hopeless exercise of trying to characterize what
‘democracy’ “really” means (Adcock and Collier, 2001). The jumble of vague and
inconsistent connotations the term has acquired—what one might call the folk concept
or “background” concept of democracy (Adcock and Collier, 2001) — may seem an
unpromising source of constraints on a definition intended for social scientific inquiry.
What social science needs is a technical (or “formalized” or “systematized”) concept
that refines our fuzzy background concept of democracy (Przeworski et al., 2000, p.
13; Adcock and Collier, 2001).
While that may be so, the example of the kindergartener’s definition shows that a
technical refinement of our fuzzy background concept still has to be tethered to the
latter somehow. It needs to be recognizable as a refinement of the background concept
of democracy, as opposed to a refinement of its opposite or something else entirely.6
Moreover, the examples in the previous section underscore the dangers of failing to
6Compare Carnap’s notion of “explication”, which aims to replace an inexact concept (the explicandum)
with a more exact and scientifically fruitful concept (the explicatum). An explication is successful insofar as
the explicatum is “similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in most cases in which the explicandum
has so far been used, the explicatum can be used” (Carnap, 1950, p. 7, quoted in Cappelen, 2018). Carnap’s
emphasis on similarity of use makes clear why a technical definition of a concept must be tethered to others’
use of that concept.
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attend to the possibly different choices about conceptual content across different schol-
arly contexts (or by different scholars working within the same context). Scholars may
think they are putting to the test widely held beliefs about democracy, or past schol-
ars’ or thinkers’ claims about democracy, when they are in fact just talking past their
intended interlocutors, unwittingly addressing a different topic altogether. If social sci-
entists want to frame their research as part of a conversation about democracy, then they
have to consider whether their technical concept of democracy is sufficiently anchored
to the background concept that they are addressing the same topic of conversation as
their interlocutors.
Despite its being vague or inconsistent, the background concept of democracy may
still have enough content to anchor our choice of a technical definition. Multifarious
uses of the concept could, despite their differences, share certain core denotations. To
wit, scholars frequently acknowledge that, across a wide range of contexts, the vari-
ous uses of ‘democracy’ more or less consistently denote the classical idea of “rule by
the people” or some nearby notion such as “popular sovereignty” or “popular control”
(e.g., Dunn, 2004). Indeed, numerous political scientists start from this classical idea
and present their proposed measures as refinements of it, meant to render it precise and
determinate enough to make measurement possible (e.g., Coppedge et al., 2011; Dahl,
1971). Even those who wish to detach the concept of democracy from its classical de-
notation recognize this venerable tradition (e.g.,Achen and Bartels, 2016; Przeworski,
2010; Riker, 1982; Schumpeter, 1942).
These remarks raise several questions. What does it mean for a background concept
to “anchor” a technical definition of democracy? What does it mean for two people
who use different definitions of ‘democracy’ (e.g., an informal, ordinary concept of
democracy and a technical concept of democracy) to discuss the same topic, and how
do we establish the topic of their conversation? We take these questions up in the next
section, where we propose topic continuity as a criterion for good technical definitions
of ‘democracy’.
In what follows, we will not argue for any specific technical definition of ‘democ-
racy’, nor will we argue that acceptable technical definitions of ‘democracy’ must be
tethered to any particular background or folk notion of democracy; we use specific
definitions of ‘democracy’ only as examples to make our reasoning more determinate.
Sorting out these issues is, of course, an important task. But it is most effectively car-
ried out within a framework of shared criteria for assessing candidate answers to these
questions. Our objective in this paper is contribute to the development of these criteria.
3 Topic continuity
We propose the following criterion, inspired by Cappelen (2018), for assessing when
a technical definition of ‘democracy’ is acceptable as a refinement of a background
concept:
Topic continuity. A candidate technical definition of ‘democracy’ is better, all else
equal, if it allows one to inquire (think, speak, write) about the same topic as
one’s interlocutors.
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Making this criterion maximally precise requires us to say something about how to
individuate topics and what it would take for two or more people to be thinking, speak-
ing, writing, and inquiring about the same topic when using the term ‘democracy’. We
can’t offer a general analysis of these matters, but fortunately using topic continuity
to assess candidate technical definitions of ‘democracy’ doesn’t require maximal pre-
cision. It will be enough for our purposes to develop rules of thumb for applying the
criterion in practice.
To warm up, consider a stylized conversation inspired by our examples in section
2. One speaker (who we’ll call “Poppy”) uses the term ‘democracy’ in a way that
emphasizes the classical notions of popular rule and its cognates; the other (who we’ll
call “Minnie”) is a proponent of a Schumpeterian minimalist definition of ‘democracy’.
POPPY: Democracy is bad for economic performance. By giving ordinary citi-
zens — workers and the poor in particular — a significant measure of influ-
ence over economic policy choices, resources are diverted away from in-
vestment in productive activities and toward consumption, which, in turn,
decreases economic growth.
MINNIE: Our empirical study shows otherwise: societies that select their politi-
cal leaders using competitive elections do not systematically differ in their
investment rates from societies that do not.
POPPY: That’s interesting, but let’s make sure we’re talking about the same
thing. As I use the term ‘democracy’, classical Athens is an archetype
of a democracy. Do you agree?
MINNIE: No. According to my technical definition, classical Athens is not a
democracy.
POPPY: Really? That’s surprising. Do you agree that Athenian citizens exer-
cised significant control over political decisions?
MINNIE: Yes.
POPPY: And you still say that Athens was not a democracy?
MINNIE: Correct.
There’s an intuitive sense in which Poppy could rightly complain at this point that
Minnie has changed the topic of conversation by adopting a minimalist definition. But
why, exactly? Can we make this intuition more precise?
The most salient feature of our imagined scenario is that Poppy and Minnie dis-
agree on how to classify classical Athens. More than that, however, they disagree
about how to classify a case that Poppy uses to anchor her understanding of democracy
as a topic of conversation. This isn’t to say that Poppy is using a precisely defined
concept of democracy; it may be vague and in desperate need of refinement. Even
still, in Poppy’s mind, whatever we’re talking about when we talk about democracy,
we are talking about a set that includes classical Athens. In effect, Poppy treats clas-
sical Athens as a test case for acceptable definitions of ‘democracy’. That’s why she
finds Minnie’s exclusion of classical Athens from the set of democracies surprising and
counterintuitive.
An important assumption about topics and definitions is that two people who use
distinct definitions of ‘democracy’ can nonetheless be talking about the same topic
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(see Cappelen, 2018, chaps. 9 and 10 passim; also Sawyer, 2018). For example, early
definitions of “the derivative” expressed in terms of infinitesimals diverge from later
definitions expressed in terms of the modern concept of a limit; the former posit the
existence of infinitesimally small numbers, while the latter do not. Nonetheless, math-
ematicians like Leibniz and Cauchy are accurately described as discussing the same
topic — the derivative — despite relying on distinct definitions. Moreover, each may
be described as discussing the same topic as an interlocutor who lacks a technical def-
inition but who has asked a question about the rate at which a moving object’s speed
is increasing at a particular point in time. If in doubt, all the participants to this con-
versation could reassure each other that they are discussing the same topic — despite
some lacking any technical definition of the key concept and some using alternative
technical definitions — by referring to particular test cases. For example, one math-
ematician might ask another, “Whatever we’re talking about when we talk about ‘the
derivative,’ or ‘instantaneous rate of change,’ you agree that the derivative is zero at the
peak of this parabolic trajectory describing the cannonball’s vertical position as a func-
tion of time, yes?”. A negative answer would be surprising; it would indicate that the
interlocutor is confused about the topic that mathematicians are discussing when they
discuss the derivative; a positive answer would reassure the questioner that, however
the respondent might define “the derivative,” they are not talking past each other, but
are discussing the same topic.
The history of the term “whale” is another example in which topic continuity has
been maintained even as definitions change.7 In pre-modern times, the term was de-
fined to mean large fish, whereas, according to modern definitions, “whale” means
large sea mammal. Nonetheless, we recognize pre-modern and modern users of the
term as discussing the same topic, which can be readily confirmed by the fact that
users of both definitions use the term to refer to paradigmatic instances of the kind
(e.g., particular humpback whales, sperm whales, and so on).
Mathematicians can use the example of the cannonball’s trajectory and zoologists
can use examples of individual whales to assure themselves that they are discussing
the same topic because these cases anchor definitions of “the derivative” and “whale”.
If one mathematician wants to define “the derivative” in a way that permits them to
discuss the same topic as other mathematicians who have discussed the derivative,
the chosen definition has to classify this case and similarly archetypical cases of the
derivative in the same way their interlocutors would classify them; analogously for
the case of “whale”. We will refer to such cases, which serve to anchor a person’s
understanding of the concept whose definition is in question, as anchor cases. For
the concept of democracy, anchor cases are those actual or hypothetical regimes that
fix a person’s understanding of the topic under discussion when they and others are
discussing democracy. They are the cases that a person might insert into statements
such as the following: “Whatever we’re talking about when we talk about democracy,
[anchor case] is a democracy”, or “Whatever we’re talking about when we talk about
democracy, [anchor case] is not a democracy.”
A judgment about an anchor case is “intuitive” in that it is pre-theoretical and not
made on the basis of an explicit definition of democracy that one has already accepted
7We take this example from Sawyer (2018).
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for other reasons. Being intuitive, in this sense, does not mean it is a mere “gut reac-
tion.” What we have in mind are instead judgments that would continue to anchor one’s
evaluation of proposed definitions even as one continues reflecting on and scrutinizing
one’s beliefs about democracy and particular cases to which the concept is supposed
to apply. If one scholar’s technical definition of democracy classifies a particular case
in a way that their interlocutor finds counterintuitive — that is, the interlocutor regards
it as a misclassification of an anchor case — that is evidence that the two are talking
past each other. It is evidence that, instead of disagreeing about which definition is
best for discussing their shared topic of conversation, they are instead discussing dif-
ferent topics. It may be inconclusive evidence; it may be that, on further reflection, the
interlocutor reconsiders their initial judgment about the case, or whether it should be
regarded as an anchor case (more on this below). But as a rule of thumb, such conflicts
between a scholar’s technical definition and an interlocutor’s judgments about putative
anchor cases indicate violations of topic continuity.
First rule of thumb. We have good reason to suspect that the topic picked out by a
technical definition of democracy diverges from the topic as understood by users
of the background concept if the technical definition classifies anchor cases in a
way that users of the background concept would find deeply counterintuitive.
Second rule of thumb. We have good reason to believe that a technical definition of
democracy picks out the same topic as that picked out by the background con-
cept if the technical definition classifies anchor cases as users of the background
concept would classify those cases.
These rules focus on the classification of anchor cases in particular, not the clas-
sification of all possible cases. This is for good reason. It would be much too strong
to argue that a technical definition preserves topic continuity only if its extension —
i.e., the set of regimes classified as democracies according to the technical concept
— is identical to the extension of the background concept. To begin with, such a re-
quirement would effectively undermine the usefulness of technical concepts, which
are introduced to make the background concept more precise; it would be surprising
if such refinements left the two concepts with identical extensions. Moreover, some
cases may strike people as borderline cases of democracy, and borderline cases make
for poor tests of topic continuity. To see this, suppose that, when pushed, Poppy would
classify post-independence Botswana as a democracy but that she doesn’t have strong
convictions about this. Suppose that Minnie also believes Botswana to be a borderline
case but her technical definition excludes it from the set of democracies (cf. Przeworski
et al., 2000, pp. 23–28). This disagreement would provide little (if any) evidence that
the two are talking past each other when they use the term “democracy”. It’s not un-
common, after all, for people who share an understanding of a concept to nonetheless
disagree about its application to borderline or obscure cases. Poppy’s complaint that
Minnie has changed the topic is plausible not because the extensions of the techni-
cal and background concepts diverge, but rather because Minnie’s technical concept
misclassifies what she regards as an archetypical case of democracy.
Insofar as one cares to preserve topic continuity, judgments about how to clas-
sify anchor cases should constrain choices about how to define a technical concept of
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democracy. Some political scientists may resist at this point, arguing that a science of
democracy should seek to eliminate such apparently “subjective” elements from po-
litical scientific practice (e.g., Green and Gerber, 2003; but see Schedler, 2012). For
one thing, intuitive judgments are often vague and opaque whereas proper technical
definitions must be precise and transparent; it’s thus unclear how intuitions about cases
could provide reasons to favor one technical definition over another. A key advantage
of procedural definitions as a technical concept is supposed to be their focus on proce-
dures with publicly observable attributes, which means that it can be applied “strictly
based on objective judgment and observational criteria” (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vree-
land, 2010, p. 74). While some political scientists are willing to admit the relevance of
intuitive judgments, those who do tend to discount their significance. To wit, “face va-
lidity”, which gauges the extent to which a measure fits with intuitive judgments about
conceptual content, is typically thought to be “the weakest way to try to demonstrate
construct validity” (Trochim and Donnelly, 2006, p. 130; cf. Adcock and Collier, 2001,
pp. 538–40). This general skepticism about “subjective” or intuitive judgments plausi-
bly explains why political scientists have overwhelmingly emphasized measurement-
related criteria for choosing among candidate technical definitions.
To deflect some of this resistance, let’s observe that using intuitive judgments about
cases to anchor one’s technical definition is a familiar, if unnoticed, feature of existing
political scientific practice. To take a typical example, Przeworski and colleagues write,
Most people think that Argentina under President Arturo Illia (1963–66)
was democratic, even though the largest party in the country was prohib-
ited from competing in the elections of July 1963. In turn, most agree
that Mexico is not democratic, even though no party is legally banned
from contesting elections. The reason is that Illia won narrowly, with 26.2
percent of votes cast, and he could have lost. In contrast, in Mexico it
was certain that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) would win.
(2000, p. 17)
The authors are here appealing to generally shared judgments about the democratic
status of Argentina under President Illia and the undemocratic status of Mexico; later,
they point out how their minimalist definition of “democracy,” which includes “ex ante
uncertainty” about electoral outcomes as a necessary condition, concurs with each of
these classificatory judgments. They register this concurrence as a reason to favor their
definition.
For another example, consider the opening passage from Levitsky and Way’s study
of “competitive authoritarian regimes”:
. . . Unlike single-party or military dictatorships, post-Cold War regimes in
Cambodia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Tai-
wan, Ukraine, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere were competitive in that opposi-
tion forces used democratic institutions to contest vigorously — and, on
occasion, successfully — for power. Nevertheless, they were not demo-
cratic. Electoral manipulation, unfair media access, abuse of state re-
sources, and varying degrees of harassment and violence skewed the play-
ing field in favor of incumbents. In other words, competition was real but
unfair. (2010, p. 1, our emphasis)
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Minimal procedural definitions classify these cases as democratic in virtue of the fact
that they hold competitive elections in which incumbents sometimes lose (e.g., Boix,
Miller and Rosato, 2012; Przeworski et al., 2000). In the authors’ view — which they
seem to expect will be widely shared — minimal definitions misclassify these cases:
they should be classified as undemocratic despite the presence of real electoral com-
petition. These intuitive judgments are then used to motivate and justify a refinement
of the minimal definition to include “fair competition” as a necessary condition for
democracy (see also p. 12–13).8
Some readers may wonder whether there can be a systematic and scientific ap-
proach to incorporating judgments about anchor cases. Given disagreement about how
to classify cases, whose judgments should we take as anchors for our technical def-
inition? Users of the background concept have a vague understanding of democracy
as a topic. Should we then avoid using their (vague) intuitions about particular cases
to anchor our technical definition? Should we be concerned that a practice of fitting
a technical definition to judgments about particular cases gives researchers one too
many degrees of freedom? Won’t such a practice enable researchers to “over-fit” the
definition of democracy in pursuit of a desired empirical result?
The answer to the first question is that the relevant judgments for anchoring a tech-
nical definition are the shared judgments of the participants in the conversation to which
a scholar wishes to contribute. If a scholar is uninterested in contributing to, say, discus-
sions of democracy among members of the Chinese Communist Party, then maintain-
ing continuity with their topic of conversation is not a priority, and a conflict between
the scholar’s definition of democracy and Chinese communists’ judgments about the
democratic status of particular regimes is no reason at all to modify or abandon the
definition. The relevant judgments are those of one’s interlocutors, who include not
just one’s contemporaries, but anyone whom one takes to be addressing the same topic
and whose claims about this topic one might wish to dispute or put to the test.
For example, when Acemoglu et al. (2019) claim that their results challenge skep-
ticism about democracy that goes back to Plato and Aristotle, they are treating Plato
and Aristotle as interlocutors in the sense that is relevant here: they are taking them-
selves to be advancing a claim about democracy that conflicts with skeptical claims
about democracy that Plato and Aristotle defended. But there is only a conflict if all
parties to this conversation are addressing the same topic. To figure out whether there
is continuity of topic, Acemoglu et al. should ask whether their definition of democracy
implies that regimes that Plato and Aristotle would classify as archetypical, anchoring
cases of democracy are in fact not democracies. If so, that is evidence that Acemoglu et
al. are in fact discussing a different topic altogether, and are thus not actually disagree-
ing with or putting to an empirical test the claims that Plato and Aristotle defended.
Indeed, this would appear to be the case. Like other modern political scientists, Ace-
moglu et al. use a definition according to which a regime is democratic only if it selects
its highest executive and legislative officeholders through competitive elections. On
8This is an example of what Collier and Levitsky (1997) call “precising”, a “strategy of conceptual
innovation” that seeks to improve a technical definition so as to resolve a “mismatch” between intuitive
judgments about particular cases and an existing technical definition (p. 42). Adcock and Collier (2001)
endorse a practice of refining a technical definition in response to unexpected implications of a definition for
particular cases.
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the most straightforward interpretation of this definition, classical Athens was not a
democracy, as the members of the assembly and the executive council (boule) were not
elected (the assembly was open to all citizens and the council’s members were selected
by lot). Yet classical Athens was obviously the paradigm case of democracy for an-
cient Greeks, one that would have anchored their understanding of the topic they were
addressing with their claims about democracy.
Let us emphasize that none of this implies there is one “true” definition of democ-
racy, or that we need to identify one unique set of classificatory judgments that should
constrain all efforts to develop a technical definition of democracy. Our point is sim-
ply that if one aims to empirically study democracy in a way that can contribute to an
existing conversation about democracy, then one’s technical definition should be con-
strained by participants’ judgments about how to classify the cases that anchor their
shared understanding of the topic of conversation.
To the second question: It is too quick to move from the thought that users have
a vague understanding of the topic to the thought that their judgments about how to
classify anchor cases are vague. To say that one has a vague understanding of the back-
ground concept is to say that one is unable to precisely define the contours of the topic
picked out by that concept. But that is consistent with having clear and well-considered
convictions about how to classify certain central cases. Consider an illustration from
a different domain. Many of us have, at best, a hazy understanding of core emotion
concepts, such as love or fear; this is just to say: many of us are unable to give precise
definitions of these concepts or enumerate all behavioral responses that fall under these
concepts. At the same time, most of us have a perfectly clear conviction about how to
classify certain particular cases: a mother feeding and gently stroking her infant is a
clear manifestation of love; a child cowering alone behind a tree to hide from a wild
bear is a clear manifestation of fear. Such judgments anchor our understanding of what
we’re talking about when we talk about love or fear. To take another example, most of
us have only a vague understanding of the concept of a living organism; there are cer-
tain entities we may be unsure how to classify, such as a virus. All the same, we have
no reservations judging that a cat, but not a stone, is an example of a living organism;
these are anchor cases that help to fix the topic of conversation. Analogously, partici-
pants in a conversation about democracy can have similarly clear judgments about how
to classify particular regimes without having a precise understanding of the concept.
What of the remaining concerns about researcher degrees of freedom and “over-
fitting”? Note, first of all, that we are proposing an additional constraint on top of
the rather minimal set of constraints on the choice of definition that scholars already
recognize. Scholars would have fewer degrees of freedom in choosing their definitions
if they recognized the criterion of topic continuity as a constraint, in addition to the
constraints of logical coherence and operationalizability that they already recognize.
Nonetheless, the reader may worry that to endorse topic continuity as a criterion,
with the associated practice of checking definitions against judgments about anchor
cases, is just to sanction a dubious practice of choosing one’s definitions so as to arrive
at desired conclusions. For example, a scholar may wish (consciously or not) to arrive
at the conclusion that democratization raises average income. If they then choose a def-
inition based in part on whether it classifies certain regimes as democracies, is there not
a danger that the scholar, after observing which countries have low average incomes,
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might form the “anchoring judgment” that regimes like Liberia, Malawi, and Niger are
not really democracies, and that “democracy” and associated terms like “competitive
elections” need to be defined in such a way that they exclude these regimes?
While this is a serious concern, we think it can be largely circumvented with a sim-
ple change to existing political scientific practice: namely, that we anchor our technical
definitions using judgments about how to classify stylized hypothetical scenarios rather
than judgments about actual cases. Notice how the concern in the previous paragraph
arises because the researchers’ judgment that Liberia is not a democracy is influenced
not only by their observations of Liberia’s political institutions and procedures but also
of its level of economic development and level of civil violence, dimensions that are
plausibly irrelevant for defining the concept of democracy. This will be true of our
judgments about how to classify any actual case, due to the simple fact that we cannot
isolate our observations along conceptually relevant dimensions from our observations
along conceptually irrelevant dimensions. As a result, judgments about how to classify
actual cases provide an inefficient tool for investigating one’s understanding of the con-
cept of democracy. To wit, many political scientists (plausibly enough) treat the United
States as an anchor case for our understanding of the concept of democracy: “What-
ever we’re talking about when we talk about democracy, it must imply that the United
States has been a democracy since [insert preferred year here]”. But what should we
take away from such a report for the purposes of crafting a technical definition? Which
features of the US are the ones that the speakers have in mind when they report this
judgment? Is it the fact that the US selects its political leaders via competitive elec-
tions? Is it a belief that US citizens have an adequate measure of control over political
decisions? Is it the fact that the US has a bicameral legislature, or that it is a federal
state, or that it has a politically independent judiciary, or that is has a politically in-
dependent civil service? To what extent do observations along potentially extraneous
dimensions influence this judgment? Since actual cases always come as a bundle of
intertwined attributes, only some of which are conceptually relevant, using judgments
about how to classify such cases is an ineffective way to go about defining a technical
concept of democracy.
Judgments about how to classify stylized hypothetical scenarios offer are a better
tool for testing and refining candidate definitions of democracy because the attributes
of hypothetical scenarios are a matter of stipulation. One can specify the attributes
of a hypothetical regime along those dimensions that are (perhaps only provisionally)
taken to be conceptually relevant while ignoring all other dimensions. If a hypothet-
ical scenario elicits strong convictions about its classification among participants in a
conversation, then such a case is useful for anchoring one’s understanding of how to
define ‘democracy’ as it is being used in the conversation.
To make this point concrete, consider how one might use hypothetical scenarios to
test whether minimalist technical definitions refine the background concept in a way
that preserves topic continuity. We start by specifying some hypothetical cases; for
each case, ask yourself whether you think it should be classified as a democracy and
then spend a moment checking whether you would retain this judgment after careful
reflection or, what amounts to the same thing, whether you can readily anticipate a line
of argument that could persuade you to overturn your initial reaction.
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Citizen assemblies. Suppose a small country were to replace its elected legislative
bodies with legislative assemblies in which all adult citizens can participate with-
out restriction — any citizen is permitted to cast a vote for or against any piece
of legislation. The results of assembly votes are binding and enforced by the
government.
Selection by lot. Suppose a country were to replace its elected legislative bodies with
legislative assemblies whose members were periodically selected by lottery to
serve a fixed term. All adult citizens are entered into the lottery and eligible to
serve in the legislative assembly. The results of assembly votes are binding and
enforced by the government.
Franchise for rich men. Suppose a country selects its political leaders by competitive
elections (fill in “competitive” as you like) but only the wealthiest 50% of male
citizens are permitted to vote in these elections.
Public officials for sale. Suppose a country selects is political leaders by competitive
elections (again, fill in “competitive” as you like) and let it be the case that all
adult citizens are permitted to vote in these elections. But suppose that it is legal
in this country for candidates for office and elected officials to enter into binding
quid pro quo contracts with private citizens and corporations, whereby they com-
mit to taking certain actions while in office (e.g., proposing certain legislation) in
exchange for monetary payment. And suppose that in this country, a private as-
sociation, which receives donations from industries and wealthy private citizens,
enters into contracts with all elected officials, who then act according to the asso-
ciation’s instructions. Neither the association nor the elected officials it contracts
with interfere in elections, which continue to be contested and free and fair. In-
cumbents are regularly removed from power and replaced with challengers, but
they, too, then enter into contracts with the private association.
Keeping in mind your considered judgments about how to classify these cases,9 ob-
serve now that most minimalist definitions of ‘democracy’ (e.g., Boix, Miller and
Rosato, 2012; Przeworski et al., 2000; Schumpeter, 1942) classify the first two cases
as nondemocracies while the third and fourth are classified as democracies. We submit
that most typical users of the background concept — including many political scientists
— will find these implications of minimalist definitions deeply counterintuitive. Given
our two rules of thumb, these counterintuitive implications are strong evidence that the
topic picked out by minimalist definitions is not the same as the topic many people
have in mind when they are thinking, speaking, writing, and inquiring about democ-
racy. This isn’t to say that minimalist definitions are “false” or “incorrect”, whatever
that might mean. It’s just to say that they likely fail to pick out what many people —
9One possible reaction is that we haven’t given enough information for you to make a confident judg-
ment. In addition, perhaps you’d want to know, for example, whether minorities’ rights are protected. Such
a reaction demonstrates how using hypothetical scenarios can be useful for not only identifying which obser-
vations along the relevant dimensions qualify a regime as democratic, but also for figuring out which aspects
of a regime are conceptually relevant.
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including many scholars — have in mind when they use the term ‘democracy’.10
Let’s take stock of the advantages of using hypothetical scenarios as test cases. To
begin with, notice that hypothetical scenarios focus our attention on attributes that are
put forward as conceptually relevant. For example, most minimalist definitions propose
that competitive elections and perhaps a minimally extensive franchise are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient to qualify as a democracy (note that Przeworski et al.
and Schumpeter do not put forward any suffrage requirement). The first two scenarios
directly test the claim that competitive elections are necessary; the third and fourth
cases directly test the joint sufficiency claim. Moreover, our hypothetical scenarios
isolate these attributes for our consideration and thereby avoid conflating our judgments
about democracy with our judgments about potentially irrelevant attributes such as
economic development or civil violence. Finally, because these hypothetical scenarios
are not drawn from any dataset we might use to empirically test hypotheses about
democracy, we need not worry that using judgments about these scenarios to anchor
our technical definition will produce empirical measures that are “over-fit” to the data
and thus biased in favor of finding results that confirm antecedently-held convictions.
Some political scientists might object here that these counterfactual cases are irrel-
evant given their scientific aims. “Empirical political science aims to study the political
world as we observe it,” they might reply; “these scenarios are beyond empirical obser-
vation and, thus, inappropriate anchors for a technical definition.” It’s true, of course,
that we wish to study the countries of the real world and not imagined utopias. But
one thing that our growing sophistication about causal inference has taught us is that is
that our efforts to explain our observations of actual countries depends on our ability
to describe what would happen, counterfactually, if they were different in certain re-
spects. Would North Korea grow richer if it became a democracy? Would the United
States grow poorer if it became an autocracy? Political scientists wish to answer ques-
tions about the counterfactual versions of actual countries both because, like scientists
generally, they are curious about the world and seek satisfying causal explanations of
what they observe in it, and because the answers to causal questions have implications
for policy and other important practical consequences. Given the centrality of causal
inference in political science, how a definition of ‘democracy’ and its operationalized
measure direct us to classify regimes in counterfactual scenarios is no less important
than the classifications they yield for actual regimes.
4 Concluding remarks: Should we change the topic?
Democracy is a central topic of public political discourse. Many political scientists
conduct empirical research on democracy as a means to make informed contributions
to these conversations. Against this background, we have argued for the following
modest proposition: If a scholar wishes to conduct research that contributes to ongo-
ing conversations about democracy, then she must adopt a definition of ‘democracy’
that picks out the topic of those conversations as understood by participants in those
conversations. For practical purposes, we have proposed that scholars test candidate
10We recognize that defenders of the minimalist approach might just as well respond by rejecting topic
continuity as a desideratum for technical definitions. We will address this response at the end of the paper.
19
definitions against the criterion of topic continuity by considering how well they con-
cur with participants’ judgments about how to classify particular regimes, emphasizing
judgments about stylized hypothetical scenarios as opposed to the regimes we observe
in the actual world. We recognize that our argument will raise more questions than it
answers but that’s the point: to show that conceptual content matters when choosing a
definition of ‘democracy’ and to initiate a discussion about the criteria we might use
for assessing these choices.
Our proposal faces a skeptical objection that we have thus far left unaddressed. Our
discussion of topic continuity and its application to political scientific practice presup-
poses that political scientists should aim to preserve topic continuity. But, after seeing
the potential implications of accepting this criterion, one might reject topic continuity
as a desideratum rather than adjust political scientific practice to meet its demands.
Moreover, one might do so with good reason: “Typical conversations about democ-
racy are vague and confused. Indeed, it is rare to find a conversation about democ-
racy that has a well-defined topic with which to maintain continuity. In view of this
confusion, political scientists should focus on steering conversations about democracy
toward conversations with well-defined topics, even if doing so means changing the
topic of conversation.”11
We think there’s something important in this objection. More specifically, we agree
that it can be appropriate for scholars to engage in some “conceptual engineering”
(Cappelen, 2018) with the aim of facilitating more productive conversations. Alas,
we can’t provide any general principles for determining when a change of topic is
preferable to preserving topic continuity. Instead, we register three notes of caution for
those who are tempted to dismiss topic continuity out of hand in favor of topic change.
First, we should be aware that, once we have changed the topic, we may no longer
be in a position to contribute to existing conversations on the basis of our empiri-
cal research, for the reasons we highlighted in section 2. This might be obvious, but
it’s worth emphasizing that there might well be a trade-off between, on the one hand,
conducting scientifically credible research on democracy and, on the other hand, con-
tributing (perhaps as a corrective) to broader conversations about democracy. We must
be alert to the realistic possibility that we cannot do both.
This naturally suggests a second caution. There is good reason to think that chang-
ing the topic should be a last resort and not the default starting point. As we have
noted several times above, we should hesitate to conclude that the topic of an ongoing
conversation about democracy is confused, equivocal, or otherwise ill-defined just be-
cause participants in that conversation do not have a precise definition of ‘democracy’
at hand. We should thus hesitate to change the topic of a conversation before we have
made a sympathetic effort to reconstruct it. This means starting from the assumption
that the conversation we wish to join has a well-defined topic, abandoning that assump-
tion only once it has become clear that the conversation is genuinely confused and, as
a result, unproductive.
Third, if a change of topic is required, we can probably do better than to hijack a
term that is already in wide circulation. Continuing to use the term ‘democracy’ while
giving it a definition that deviates from ordinary usage is, at a minimum, an odd strategy
11Przeworski (2010, esp. chaps. 1–2) provides a forceful expression of this thought.
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for gaining clarity. Why not instead choose a more precise label for one’s technical
concept, such as “polyarchy” (Dahl, 1971) or “competitive electoral regime”? If one
insists on using the label ‘democracy’ for a technical concept that diverges sharply
from the background concept, this suggests that one wishes to be seen as discussing
the same topic as others who use the term ‘democracy’, which implies some concern
for preserving topic continuity.
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